David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 71 (1):19 - 34 (2009)
The paper attempts to give an account of the introspective self-knowledge of our own experiences which is in line with representationalism about phenomenal consciousness and the transparency of experience. A two-step model is presented. First, a demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing this’ is formed which refers to what one experiences, by means of attention. Plausibly, this thought is knowledge, since safe. Second, a non-demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing a pain’ occurs. This second self-ascription is justified inferentially, on the basis of the first, demonstrative thought. Thus, an account of introspective experiential self-knowledge can be developed which is richer and more adequate to the phenomena than pure reliabilism and Dretske’s displaced perception model. There is really such a thing as introspection, but no inner sense.
|Keywords||Philosophy Logic Ethics Ontology Epistemology Philosophy|
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References found in this work BETA
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Michael Bergmann (2006). Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford University Press.
Laurence BonJour (1985). The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
Citations of this work BETA
Cynthia Macdonald (2014). In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge. Synthese (15):1-26.
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