Kant's invidious humanism

Environmental Ethics 5 (1):63-70 (1983)
In Kant’s philosophy nonrational beings are denied moral standing. I argue that Kant's rational humanism is arbitrary and morally impoverished. In particular I show that Kant moves illegitimately from the first formulation of the categorical imperative (which makes no mention of a moral domain) to the second (which limits moral recognition to rational beings). The move to the second formulation relies on a new and unsupported principle introduced by Kant: rational nature and only rational nature exists as an end in itself.
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DOI 10.5840/enviroethics19835137
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