Online research in philosophy

In contrast to theoretical discussions about potential professional liability of clinical ethicists, this report gives the results of empirical data gathered in a national survey of clinical medical ethicists. The report assesses the types of activities of clinical ethicists, the extent and types of their professional liability coverage, and the influence that concerns about legal liability has on how they function as clinical ethicists. In addition demographic data on age, sex, educational background, etc. are reported. The results show that while nearly one third (28.9%) of the ethicists regularly make recommendations about patient care, only 10.8% of them regularly make entries in the medical record; only approximately half (53.0%) of them are covered by professional liability (malpractice) insurance; and the vast majority (84.3%) of them say that concerns about legal liability do not influence the way they function as clinical ethicists.

This essay discusses unlimited insurance subrogation (UIS) as a means of improving the deterrence and compensation results of medical malpractice law. Under UIS, health care insureds could assign their entire potential medical malpractice claims to their first-party commercial and government insurers. UIS should improve deterrence by establishing first-party insurers as plaintiffs to confront liability insurers on the defense side, leading to more effective prosecution of meritorious claims and reducing meritless and unnecessary litigation. UIS should improve compensation outcomes by converting litigation cost- and risk- laden “tort insurance” into cheaper and enhanced first-party insurance. UIS also promises dynamic benefits through further reforms by contract between the first-party and liability insurers that would take charge of system. No UIS-related costs are apparent that would outweigh these benefits.

Malpractice insurance rates have created a crisis in American medicine. Rates are rising and reimbursements are not keeping pace. In response, physicians in the states hardest hit by this crisis are feeling compelled to take political action, and the current action of choice seems to be physician strikes. While the malpractice insurance crisis is acknowledged to be severe, does it justify the extreme action of a physician walkout? Should physicians engage in this type of collective action, and what are the costs to patients and the profession when such action is taken? I will offer three related arguments against physician strikes that constitute a prima facie prohibition against such action: first, strikes are intended to cause harm to patients; second, strikes are an affront to the physician-patient relationship; and, third, strikes risk decreasing the public's respect for the medical profession. As with any prima facie obligation, there are justifying conditions that may override the moral prohibition, but I will argue that the current malpractice crisis does not rise to the level of such a justifying condition. While the malpractice crisis demands and justifies a political response on the part of the nation's physicians, strikes and slow-downs are not an ethically justified means to the legitimate end of controlling insurance costs.