The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns

Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949 (2010)
Abstract Minimalism is currently the received deflationary theory of truth. On minimalism, truth is a transparent concept and a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I situate minimalism within current deflationary debate about truth by contrasting it with its main alternative―the redundancy theory of truth (according to which truth is a transparent concept but not a property). I also outline three of the primary challenges facing minimalism, its formulation, explanatory adequacy and stability, and draw some lessons for the soundness of its conception of truth.
Keywords Truth  Deflationism  Minimalism  Horwich
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    Dirk Greimann (2000). Explicating Truth: Minimalism and Primitivism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 31 (1):133-155.
    Richard Holton (1993). Minimalism About Truth. In B. Garrett & K. Mulligan (eds.), Themes from Wittgenstein. ANU Working Papers in Philosophy 4.
    Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.

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