David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 128 (2):409-440 (2006)
The idea of truthmakers is important for doing serious metaphysics, since a truthmaker principle can give us important guidance in finding out what we would like to include into our ontology. Recently, David Lewis has argued against Armstrong’s argument that a plausible truthmaker principle requires us to accept facts. I would like to take a close look at the argument. I will argue in detail that the Humean principle of recombination on which Lewis relies is not plausible (independently of the issue of facts). Then I will show that the right truthmaker principle that vindicates facts is superior to the modified truthmaker principle that Lewis has proposed. This will lead into the topic of being and existence. It turns out that truthmaking and facts are plausible, well suited for one another, and very coherent with a plausible conception of being.
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1989). A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge University Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press.
John Bigelow (1988). The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
John C. Bigelow (1988). Real Possibilities. Philosophical Studies 53 (1):37 - 64.
John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter (1990). Science and Necessity. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Pendlebury (2010). Facts and Truth-Making. Topoi 29 (2):137-145.
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