David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 35 (2):161-170 (2007)
According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2) it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to pass muster, I argue that, within the constraints of a non-reductive physicalism and a holism concerning the concepts of truth, reference and meaning, conceding Field’s physicalistic inadequacy conclusion while rejecting his conceptual deficiency conclusion is a promising reply to the incompleteness objection.
|Keywords||Atomism Field Holism Reference Tarski Truth|
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press.
Hartry Field (2001). Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford University Press.
Alfred Tarski (1956). Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Paul Benacerraf (1973). Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
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