David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 3 (1):66-74 (2009)
This essay critically considers scientific and metaphorical understandings of the body and embodiment. It employs interrogates and employs the concepts of embodiment, ego, bodily intentionality, and anorexia from a phenomenological perspective. It considers the battery of concepts regarding embodiment: soma (the shape of the body), sarx (the flesh of the body) and pexis (the body and soul in unity). While Soma and sarx are the objective body, they are explained by the natural sciences. Pexis is the 'unobjective' body; it is subjective, and it is to be studied as a subjective phenomenon. To understand pexis means to understand that the body does not finish with the skin but is connected to its surroundings. There is also a consideration of the possibilities of the body under Heidegger's idea of protention, which refers to the transformation of the body into an instrument. When the body is conceived of as an instrument or object anorexia is seen as an illness only of embodiment as soma . A richer alternative is the idea that anorexia is an illness of existence that can be explained by Heidegger's discussion of embodiment via the concept of dasein
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Irena Martínková (2011). Anthropos as Kinanthropos: Heidegger and PatoČka on Human Movement. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 5 (3):217 - 230.
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