Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Philosophy 101 (5):242-254 (2004)
|Abstract||Creatures that have different physical realizations than human beings may or may not be conscious. Ned Block’s ‘harder problem of consciousness’ is that naturalistic phenomenal realists have no conception of a rational ground for belief that they have or have not discovered consciousness in such a creature. Drawing on the notion of inference to the best explanation, it appears the arguments to these conclusions beg the question and ignore that explanation may be a guide to discovery. Thus, best explanation can both validate an interpretation of the evidence and lead to the discovery of consciousness.|
|Keywords||Consciousness Evidence Experience Explanation Metaphysics Naturalism Block, N|
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