Phenomenal Variability and Introspective Reliability

Mind and Language 26 (3):261-286 (2011)
Abstract
There is surprising evidence that introspection of our phenomenal states varies greatly between individuals and within the same individual over time. This puts pressure on the notion that introspection gives reliable access to our own phenomenology: introspective unreliability would explain the variability, while assuming that the underlying phenomenology is stable. I appeal to a body of neurocomputational, Bayesian theory and neuroimaging findings to provide an alternative explanation of the evidence: though some limited testing conditions can cause introspection to be unreliable, mostly it is our phenomenology itself that is variable. With this account of phenomenal variability, the occurrence of the surprising evidence can be explained while generally retaining introspective reliability
Keywords introspection  perceptual inference  default mode
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References found in this work BETA
Karl J. Friston (2005). Hallucinations and Perceptual Inference. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):764-766.

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