David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 20 (2):141-162 (2005)
Some monothematic types of delusions may arise because subjects have unusual experiences. The role of this experiential component in the pathogenesis of delusion is still not understood. Focussing on delusions of alien control, we outline a model for reality testing competence on unusual experiences. We propose that nascent delusions arise when there are local failures of reality testing performance, and that monothematic delusions arise as normal responses to these. In the course of this we address questions concerning the tenacity with which delusions are maintained, their often bizarre content, the patients' inability to dismiss them, and their often circumscribed character
|Keywords||Delusion Doxastic Epistemology Experience Reality Testing|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jakob Hohwy (2013). Delusions, Illusions and Inference Under Uncertainty. Mind and Language 28 (1):57-71.
Jakob Hohwy & Vivek Rajan (2012). Delusions as Forensically Disturbing Perceptual Inferences. Neuroethics 5 (1):5-11.
Jakob Hohwy (2011). Phenomenal Variability and Introspective Reliability. Mind and Language 26 (3):261-286.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):195-216.
Garry Young (2011). Beliefs, Experiences and Misplaced Being: An Interactionist Account of Delusional Misidentification. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):195-215.
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