David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind 103 (410):123-130 (1994)
Quantification into a belief ascription has often been taken to indicate that the believer knows who (or what) their belief is about. Here it is shown, by means of some iterated ascriptions, that this cannot be the correct interpretation of such quantification. In conclusion it is suggested that it should rather be interpreted as indicating that the belief has its source in the object denoted by the quantifier.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Berit Brogaard (2007). Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap? Philosophy Compass 3 (1):93-118.
Similar books and articles
Kenneth A. Taylor (2003). Singular Beliefs and Their Ascriptions. In Reference and the Rational Mind. Csli Publications
David Braun (2001). Russellianism and Prediction. Philosophical Studies 105 (1):59 - 105.
Joel Smith (2006). Which Immunity to Error? Philosophical Studies 130 (2):273-83.
Emar Maier (2004). Acquaintance Resolution and Belief de Re. In Laura Alonso i Alemany & Paul Égré (eds.), Proceedings of the 9th Esslli Student Session.
Dilip Ninan (2010). De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):551-567.
Ari Maunu (2002). A Problem with De Re Belief Ascriptions, with a Consequence to Substitutivity. Philosophia 29 (1-4):411-421.
Ari Maunu (2000). A Simple Solution to the Problem of De Se Belief Ascriptions. Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 33 (3-4):199-226.
David Pickles (1995). Holton on Attitude Ascriptions and Intermediate Scope. Mind 104 (415):577-582.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads153 ( #23,714 of 1,902,209 )
Recent downloads (6 months)45 ( #19,517 of 1,902,209 )
How can I increase my downloads?