Consistency in Presuming Agnosticism

Philo 4 (1):82-89 (2001)
Abstract
According to the presumption of atheism, we are to presume disbelief unless agnosticism or theism can be adequately defended. In this paper I will defend the presumption of atheism against a popular objection made by Thomas Morris and elucidate an insuperable difficulty for any attempt to argue for a presumption of agnosticism
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DOI 10.5840/philo2001417
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J. Angelo Corlett & Josh Cangelosi (2015). Atheism and Epistemic Justification. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (1):91-106.

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