Dualism and secondary quality eliminativism: Putting a new spin on the knowledge argument
Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229-56 (2006)
| Abstract | Frank Jackson formulated his knowledge argument as an argument for dualism. In this paper I show how the argument can be modified to also establish the irreducibility of the secondary qualities to the properties of physical theory, and ultimately. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Dualism Knowledge Metaphysics Secondary Quality Jackson, Frank | |||||||||
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