Dispositions all the way round

Analysis 59 (1):9-14 (1999)
Abstract
Simon Blackburn has argued that science finds only dispositional properties. If true, this is surprising: we think of the world as containing categorical properties too. But Blackburn thinks that our difficulties go further than this: that the idea of a world containing just dispositional properties is not simply surprising, but incoherent. The problem is made clear, he argues, when we have a counterfactual analysis of dispositions, and then understand counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds.
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Citations of this work BETA
Alexander Bird (2007). The Regress of Pure Powers? Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):513–534.
Neil E. Williams (2011). Dispositions and the Argument From Science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):71 - 90.

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