How is strength of will possible?

In Christine Tappolet & Sarah Stroud (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford 39-67 (2003)
Most recent accounts of will-power have tried to explain it as reducible to the operation of beliefs and desires. In opposition to such accounts, this paper argues for a distinct faculty of will-power. Considerations from philosophy and from social psychology are used in support.
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Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1093/0199257361.003.0003
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Tim Bayne (2008). The Phenomenology of Agency. Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
Neil Levy (2011). Resisting 'Weakness of the Will'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):134 - 155.
Neil Levy (2006). Autonomy and Addiction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):427-447.
Alfred Mele (2010). Weakness of Will and Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):391–404.

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