In Christine Tappolet & Sarah Stroud (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford (2003)
|Abstract||Most recent accounts of will-power have tried to explain it as reducible to the operation of beliefs and desires. In opposition to such accounts, this paper argues for a distinct faculty of will-power. Considerations from philosophy and from social psychology are used in support.|
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