David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The first is that we are wrong to suggest that the mainstream is no longer limited to a restrictive orthodoxy of beliefs and assumptions that discourages dissenting voices. In developing his argument, Vernengo claims that our characterization of a cutting edge branch of the mainstream that does not hold to a neoclassical orthodoxy is misleading. Although he states that he accepts our characterization of the economics profession as a complex adaptive system, with many competing views, he sees the cutting edge as a sham. He argues that the true role of the cutting edge is to allow the mainstream to “sound reasonable when talking about reality, while orthodoxy provides authority to the cutting edge.” He calls this an “organized hypocrisy” and calls us naive about the sociology of the economics profession. Because of this naiveté on our part he believes that we are giving bad advice to advocate that heterodox economists should think of themselves as economists first and heterodox economists second.
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