Intention and weakness of will

Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241-262 (1999)
Philosophical orthodoxy identifies weakness of will with akrasia: the weak willed person is someone who intentionally acts against their better judgement. It is argued that this is a mistake. Weakness of will consists in a quite different failing, namely an over-ready revision of one's intentions. Building on the work of Bratman, an account of such over-ready revision is given. A number of examples are then adduced showing how weakness of will, so understood, differs from akrasia.
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DOI jphil199996535
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Gideon Rosen (2004). Skepticism About Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):295–313.
Neil Levy (2011). Resisting 'Weakness of the Will'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):134 - 155.

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