David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241-262 (1999)
Philosophical orthodoxy identifies weakness of will with akrasia: the weak willed person is someone who intentionally acts against their better judgement. It is argued that this is a mistake. Weakness of will consists in a quite different failing, namely an over-ready revision of one's intentions. Building on the work of Bratman, an account of such over-ready revision is given. A number of examples are then adduced showing how weakness of will, so understood, differs from akrasia.
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Citations of this work BETA
Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2014). How is Willpower Possible? The Puzzle of Synchronic Self‐Control and the Divided Mind. Noûs 48 (1):41-74.
Sarah Moss (2014). Credal Dilemmas. Noûs 48 (3):665-683.
Gideon Rosen (2004). Skepticism About Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):295–313.
Neil Levy (2011). Resisting 'Weakness of the Will'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):134 - 155.
Allen Coates (2013). The Enkratic Requirement. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):320-333.
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