Law and Philosophy 17 (s 5-6):597-625 (1998)
|Abstract||Can one consistently (i) be a positivist, and (ii) think that the internal attitude to the law is a moral attitude? Two objections are raised in the literature. The first is that the combination is straight-out contradictory. The second is that if the internal attitude is a moral attitude, those who take it cannot be positivists. Arguments from Shiner, Goldsworthy and Raz are examined. It is concluded that neither objection works. The arguments are based on scope errors, conflations of what is said with what is implicated, and a false view of the distinction between detached and committed statements.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
William Kline (2006). Business Ethics From the Internal Point of View. Journal of Business Ethics 64 (1):57 - 67.
Guillaume Aucher (2010). An Internal Version of Epistemic Logic. Studia Logica 94 (1).
Carlo Cellucci, Knowledge and the Meaning of Human Life. naturalism.org.
William G. Lycan (1995). Consciousness as Internal Monitoring. Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.
Christian Dahlman (2009). The Difference Between Obedience Assumed and Obedience Accepted. Ratio Juris 22 (2):187-196.
Mark McBride (2011). Raz on the Internal Point of View. Legal Theory 17:67-73.
Maria Jimenez-Buedo & Luis M. Miller, Experiments in the Social Sciences: The Relationship Between External and Internal Validity.
Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (2011). The Anarchist Official: A Problem for Legal Positivism. Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 36:89-112.
E. N. G. Svein (2011). Lost in the System or Lost in Translation? The Exchanges Between Hart and Ross. Ratio Juris 24 (2):194-246.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #46,518 of 556,773 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,754 of 556,773 )
How can I increase my downloads?