Relational autonomy and paternalistic interventions

Res Publica 15 (4):321-336 (2009)
Abstract
Relational conceptions of autonomy attempt to take into account the social aspects of autonomous agency. Those views that incorporate not merely causally, but constitutively necessary relational conditions, incorporate a condition that has the form: (RelAgency) A necessary condition for autonomous agency is that the agent stands in social relations S. I argue that any account that incorporates such a condition (irrespective of how the relations, S, are spelt out) cannot play one of autonomy’s key normative roles: identifying those agents who ought to be protected from (hard) paternalistic intervention. I argue, against objections from Oshana, that there are good reasons for maintaining the notion of autonomy in this role, and thus that such relational conceptions should not be accepted. This rejection goes beyond that from John Christman, which holds only for those relational conditions which are value-laden.
Keywords Autonomy  Relational conditions  Paternalism  Marina Oshana  John Christman
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,768
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Paul Benson (1994). Free Agency and Self-Worth. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-58.
John Christman (1991). Autonomy and Personal History. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):1 - 24.

View all 17 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-07-13

Total downloads

72 ( #18,990 of 1,098,977 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #27,099 of 1,098,977 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.