David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Res Publica 15 (4):321-336 (2009)
Relational conceptions of autonomy attempt to take into account the social aspects of autonomous agency. Those views that incorporate not merely causally, but constitutively necessary relational conditions, incorporate a condition that has the form: (RelAgency) A necessary condition for autonomous agency is that the agent stands in social relations S. I argue that any account that incorporates such a condition (irrespective of how the relations, S, are spelt out) cannot play one of autonomy’s key normative roles: identifying those agents who ought to be protected from (hard) paternalistic intervention. I argue, against objections from Oshana, that there are good reasons for maintaining the notion of autonomy in this role, and thus that such relational conceptions should not be accepted. This rejection goes beyond that from John Christman, which holds only for those relational conditions which are value-laden.
|Keywords||Autonomy Relational conditions Paternalism Marina Oshana John Christman|
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References found in this work BETA
Louise M. Antony (1995). Is Psychological Individualism a Piece of Ideology? Hypatia 10 (3):157 - 174.
Nomy Arpaly (2003). Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency. Oxford University Press.
Paul Benson (1994). Free Agency and Self-Worth. Journal of Philosophy 91 (12):650-58.
John Christman (1991). Autonomy and Personal History. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):1 - 24.
John Christman (2004). Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):143-164.
Citations of this work BETA
Anna-Marie Greaney, Dónal P. O'Mathúna & P. Anne Scott (2012). Patient Autonomy and Choice in Healthcare: Self-Testing Devices as a Case in Point. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 15 (4):383-395.
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