Online research in philosophy

Introduction to the Symposium on Gender Equality and Cultural Justice Content Type Journal Article Pages 145-146 DOI 10.1007/s11158-008-9063-1 Authors Andrea Baumeister, University of Stirling Department of Politics Stirling FK9 5SG UK Journal Res Publica Online ISSN 1572-8692 Print ISSN 1356-4765 Journal Volume Volume 14 Journal Issue Volume 14, Number 3.

Georg Simmel: The View of Life: Four Metaphysical Chapters Content Type Journal Article Pages 229-230 DOI 10.1007/s10746-011-9180-2 Authors Richard Swedberg, Department of Sociology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA Journal Human Studies Online ISSN 1572-851X Print ISSN 0163-8548 Journal Volume Volume 34 Journal Issue Volume 34, Number 2.

Silhouettes: A Reply from the Dark Side Content Type Journal Article Pages 199-211 DOI 10.1007/s12136-010-0103-z Authors Roy Sorensen, Department of Philosophy, Washington University, One Brookings Drive - Campus Box 1073, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA Journal Acta Analytica Online ISSN 1874-6349 Print ISSN 0353-5150 Journal Volume Volume 26 Journal Issue Volume 26, Number 2.

Review of Martha J. Farah, ed., Neuroethics: An Introduction with Readings Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 263-265 DOI 10.1007/s12152-011-9103-y Authors Walter Glannon, Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, 2500 University Dr. NW, Calgary, AB T2N 1N4, Canada Journal Neuroethics Online ISSN 1874-5504 Print ISSN 1874-5490 Journal Volume Volume 4 Journal Issue Volume 4, Number 3.

Review of Enrique Bonete, Neuroética Práctica ( Practical Neuroethics ) Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 267-270 DOI 10.1007/s12152-011-9114-8 Authors Carissa Véliz, Department of Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy, and History and Philosophy of Law, University of Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain Journal Neuroethics Online ISSN 1874-5504 Print ISSN 1874-5490 Journal Volume Volume 4 Journal Issue Volume 4, Number 3.

Richard Capobianco: Engaging Heidegger Content Type Journal Article Pages 231-236 DOI 10.1007/s10746-011-9185-x Authors William Koch, Department of Philosophy, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA Journal Human Studies Online ISSN 1572-851X Print ISSN 0163-8548 Journal Volume Volume 34 Journal Issue Volume 34, Number 2.

Drawing on results discussed in the target article by Baumeister et al. (1), I argue that the claim that the modern mind sciences are discovering that free will is an illusion ( willusionism ) is ambiguous and depends on how ordinary people understand free will. When interpreted in ways that the evidence does not justify, the willusionist claim can lead to ‘bad results.’ That is, telling people that free will is an illusion leads people to cheat more, help less, and behave more aggressively, but these responses may be based on people’s interpreting willusionist claims to mean that they lack the powers of rational choice and self-control.

Free will can be understood as a novel form of action control that evolved to meet the escalating demands of human social life, including moral action and pursuit of enlightened self-interest in a cultural context. That understanding is conducive to scientific research, which is reviewed here in support of four hypotheses. First, laypersons tend to believe in free will. Second, that belief has behavioral consequences, including increases in socially and culturally desirable acts. Third, laypersons can reliably distinguish free actions from less free ones. Fourth, actions judged as free emerge from a distinctive set of inner processes, all of which share a common psychological and physiological signature. These inner processes include self-control, rational choice, planning, and initiative.

This contribution to a symposium on an article by Roy Baumeister, A. William Crescioni, and Jessica Alquist focuses on a tension between compatibilist and incompatibilist elements in that article. In their discussion of people’s beliefs about free will, Baumeister et al. sometimes sound like incompatibilists; but in their presentation of their work on psychological processes of free will, they sound more like compatibilists than like incompatibilists. It is suggested that Baumeister and coauthors are attempting to study free will in a metaphysically neutral way and that, because this is so, the incompatibilist elements of the article are out of place.

Further Thoughts on Counterfactuals, Compatibilism, Conceptual Mismatches, and Choices: Response to Commentaries Content Type Journal Article Pages 31-34 DOI 10.1007/s12152-010-9067-3 Authors Roy F. Baumeister, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA A. William Crescioni, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA Jessica L. Alquist, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL USA Journal Neuroethics Online ISSN 1874-5504 Print ISSN 1874-5490 Journal Volume Volume 4 Journal Issue Volume 4, Number 1.