David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):484 – 487 (1996)
Michael Smith has argued that to value an action is to believe that if one were fully rational one would desire that one perform it. I offer the Muggletonians as a counter-example. The Muggletonians, a 17th century English sect, believed that reason was the path of the Devil. They believed that their fully rational selves - rational in just Smith's sense - would have blasphemed against God; and that their rational selves would have wanted their actual selves to do likewise. But blaspheming against God was not what they valued.
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Smith (1994). The Moral Problem. Blackwell.
Michael Smith (1992). Valuing: Desiring or Believing? In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford University Press 323--60.
E. P. Thompson (1993). Witness Against the Beast William Blake and the Moral Law. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
Citations of this work BETA
John Bigelow & Michael Smith (1997). How Not to Be Muddled by a Meddlesome Muggletonian. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4):511 – 527.
Owen Anderson (2010). Moral Objectivity and Responsibility in Ethics: A Socratic Response to Hume's Legacy in the 20th Century. Heythrop Journal 51 (2):178-191.
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