Scepticism and causal theories of knowledge

Mind 86 (344):555-573 (1977)
The question discussed is whether the conditions for knowledge laid down by externalist or causal theories of knowledge render knowledge claims secure from scepticism of the cartesian kind. a simple account of such conditions encourages an affirmative answer. but such an account proves inadequate and some of the conditions of an adequate account are sketched. once these conditions are introduced, it is argued, knowledge claims appear as open as ever to sceptical challenge. however it is also seen how modest knowledge claims may be upheld, and the conclusion reached is that the type of theory discussed allows us to compromise with scepticism rather than to capitulate
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