Unity and the Frege–Geach problem

Philosophical Studies 163 (1):15-24 (2013)
The problem of the unity of the proposition asks what binds together the constituents of a proposition into a fully formed proposition that provides truth conditions for the assertoric sentence that expresses it, rather than merely a set of objects. Hanks’ solution is to reject the traditional distinction between content and force. If his theory is successful, then there is a plausible extension of it that readily solves the Frege–Geach problem for normative propositions. Unfortunately Hanks’ theory isn’t successful, but it does point to significant connections between expressivism, unity, and embedding
Keywords Metaethics  Frege–Geach  Expressivism  Unity of the proposition  Content–force
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0079-1
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,914
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Scott Soames (2012). What is Meaning? Princeton University Press.
P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.

View all 9 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Daniel Rothschild (2012). Expressing Credences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.
P. T. Geach (1960). Ascriptivism. Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.
Paul Horwich (2005). The Frege‐Geach Point. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):78–93.
P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

100 ( #25,444 of 1,725,624 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

17 ( #45,585 of 1,725,624 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.