Unity and the Frege–Geach problem

Philosophical Studies 163 (1):15-24 (2013)
Abstract
The problem of the unity of the proposition asks what binds together the constituents of a proposition into a fully formed proposition that provides truth conditions for the assertoric sentence that expresses it, rather than merely a set of objects. Hanks’ solution is to reject the traditional distinction between content and force. If his theory is successful, then there is a plausible extension of it that readily solves the Frege–Geach problem for normative propositions. Unfortunately Hanks’ theory isn’t successful, but it does point to significant connections between expressivism, unity, and embedding
Keywords Metaethics  Frege–Geach  Expressivism  Unity of the proposition  Content–force
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References found in this work BETA
P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
Peter W. Hanks (2007). The Content–Force Distinction. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):141-64.

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P. T. Geach (1965). Assertion. Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
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