David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Bernard Elevitch (ed.), Theoria. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 65-81 (2000)
Perceptual and other consciousness is left out of or is not adequately characterized in naturalist accounts, including eliminative materialism and neural functionalism. We need a radically new start. Phenomenologically, if you are perceptually conscious, then a world—a changing totality of things—must somehow exist. Partly because with consciousness nothing is hidden and all can be reported without inference, perceptual consciousness itself is literally to be understood as things existing spatio-temporally. This account of consciousness as existence does not reduce it to mental worlds and satisfies our conviction of the reality of consciousness—mainly we do not think of it as ethereal or gossamer. The account also explains fundamental subjectivity, as the naturalist accounts cannot, and passes a test having to do with the mind-body problem. It is a near-naturalism. The account can be defended against objections about brains in vats, chairs in minds, and leaving out consciousness
|Keywords||Consciousness Existence Mind|
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