Determinism as true, both compatibilism and incompatibilism as false, and the real problem

In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford Up. 461--476 (2002)
An event is something in space and time, just some of it, and so it is rightly said to be something that occurs or happens. For at least these reasons it is not a number or a proposition, or any abstract object. There are finer conceptions of an event, of course, one being a thing having a general property for a time, another being exactly an individual property of a thing -- say my computer monitor's weight (19 kg) as against yours (also 19 kg). None of these finer conceptions can put in doubt that events are individuals in a stretch of time and space.
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