Essays on Freedom of Action

Routledge and Kegan Paul (1973)
Abstract
the difference, within the field of physically undetermined events, between the random and the non-random is the presence or absence of a prior mental event ...
Keywords Action  Coercion  Determinism  Explanation  Free Will  Indifference  Libertarianism  Mechanism  Metaphysics  Modality  Rational  Responsibility  Spontaneity  Hampshire, S  Sartre
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Call number BJ1461.H565 1973
ISBN(s) 0710088833  
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Michael Gorr (1979). Willing, Trying and Doing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):237 – 250.
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Bruce Aune (1963). Abilities, Modalities, and Free Will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (March):397-413.
Timothy O'Connor, Free Will. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Galen Strawson (2003). Mental Ballistics or the Involuntariness of Spontaniety. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):227-257.
Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.
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