Graduate studies at Western
In On Determinism and Freedom. Edinburgh University Press (2005)
Benjamin Libet and also Libet and collaborators claim to advance a single hypothesis, with important consequences, about the time of a conscious experience in relation to the time when there occurs a certain physical condition in the brain. This condition is spoken of as
_neural__adequacy_ for the experience, or, as we can as well say, _neural adequacy_ .5 This finding has been taken to throw doubt on theories that take neural and mental events to be in necessary or lawlike connection, and also certain identity theories of mind and brain, as well as determinist theories
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