Seeing qualia and positing the world

In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 129-152 (1992)
It is the business of philosophy to deal without presupposition with the question of the general nature of the world and with the question of how or indeed whether we can know that nature. These are questions to which answers are given in the realism of ordinary belief, as it can be called, the phenomenalism of Berkeley, the pragmatism and the scientism of Quine, and the varieties of scepticism. The ontological and the epistemological questions are bound up with another, that of the nature of perception—the question of what it is, in general, that happens when we perceive. What is called naive realism is an answer, as are representation theories, and phenomenalism again. If the question might be better defined, so as to distinguish it from the related scientific question, it is no matter of mere conceptual analysis. Let us start with this question of the nature of perception
Keywords Experience  Observation  Qualia  Reality
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DOI 10.1017/S1358246100007736
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