The Consequences of Determinism: A Theory of Determinism, Volume 2
Clarendon Press (1990)
| Abstract | In The Consequences of Determinism, originally Part Three of the single-volume hardback edition, Honderich poses the following question: if determinism is true, and free will an illusion, what are the consequences? Honderich maintains that both of the entrenched and traditional doctrines about the consequences of determinism, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism, are provably false, and formulates a new answer to the question. | |||||||||
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| ISBN(s) | 9780198242833 0198242832 | |||||||||
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