Belief and freedom of mind

Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):195 – 204 (2009)
There are concepts of freedom of mind and freedom of belief which do not depend on the freedom of agency. After discussing some impediments to such freedom of mind, the paper explores some arguments of Dennett, Michael Smith and Philip Pettit, and Josefa Toribio. Borrowing ideas from Schiller, the paper concludes that such freedom has an emotional or aesthetic dimension
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DOI 10.1080/13869790902838449
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Christopher Hookway (2001). Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Virtue. In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press 178--99.

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