Kant's normative ethics
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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One central moral idea is that your doing some act is morally permissible only if others’ doing that act would also be morally permissible. There are a number of different ways of developing this idea. One is the suggestion that, before deciding to do some act, you should ask yourself ‘What if everyone did that?’ Another central moral idea is that it is immoral to ‘use’ people.
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