Moral Particularism

Oxford University Press (2000)
A timely and penetrating investigation, this book seeks to transform moral philosophy. In the face of continuing disagreement about which general moral principles are correct, there has been a resurgence of interest in the idea that correct moral judgements can be only about particular cases. This view--moral particularism--forecasts a revolution in ordinary moral practice that has until now consisted largely of appeals to general moral principles. Moral particularism also opposes the primary aim of most contemporary normative moral theory that attempts to show that either one general principle, or a set of general principles, is superior to all its rivals.
Keywords Ethics  Individuation (Philosophy
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Call number BJ1012.M6333 2000
ISBN(s) 0198238835   9780198238836  
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Robert Audi (2008). Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):475 - 492.
Stephen M. Gardiner (2006). A Core Precautionary Principle. Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (1):33–60.

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