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- Kevin D. Hoover (2003). Nonstationary Time Series, Cointegration, and the Principle of the Common Cause. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4).forcefully restates his well-known counterexample to Reichenbach's principle of the common cause: bread prices in Britain and sea levels in Venice both rise over time and are, therefore, correlated; yet they are ex hypothesi not causally connected, which violates the principle of the common cause. The counterexample employs nonstationary data—i.e., data with time-dependent population moments. Common measures of statistical association do not generally reflect probabilistic dependence among nonstationary data. I demonstrate the inadequacy of the counterexample and of some previous responses to it, as well as illustrating more appropriate measures of probabilistic dependence in the nonstationary case. A challenge to the principle of the common cause Sober's argument and the attempts to rescue the principle Probabilistic dependence Nonstationary time series Probabilistic dependence in nonstationary time series Do Venetian sea levels and British bread prices violate the principle of the common cause?In my reading list | Discuss this article | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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When two causally independent processes each have a quantity that increases monotonically (either deterministically or in probabilistic expectation), the two quantities will be correlated, thus providing a counterexample to Reichenbach's principle of the common cause. Several philosophers have denied this, but I argue that their efforts to save the principle are unsuccessful. Still, one salvage attempt does suggest a weaker principle that avoids the initial counterexample. However, even this weakened principle is mistaken, as can be seen by exploring the concepts (...)
The common cause principle states that common causes produce correlations amongst their effects, but that common effects do not produce correlations amongst their causes. I claim that this principle, as explicated in terms of probabilistic relations, is false in classical statistical mechanics. Indeterminism in the form of stationary Markov processes rather than quantum mechanics is found to be a possible saviour of the principle. In addition I argue that if causation is to be explicated in terms of probabilities, then it (...)
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Is the common cause principle merely one of a set of useful heuristics for discovering causal relations, or is it rather a piece of heavy duty metaphysics, capable of grounding the direction of causation itself? Since the principle was introduced in Reichenbach’s groundbreaking work The Direction of Time (1956), there have been a series of attempts to pursue the latter program—to take the probabilistic relationships constitutive of the principle of the common cause and use them to ground the direction of (...)
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| Discuss this article | Edit | Categorize | My bibliography | Export citation | Other links: philsci-archive.pitt.edu springerlink.com | Scholar | More..
| | Other links: philsci-archive.pitt.edu springerlink.com | Scholar | More.. In a recent article, Elliot Sober responds to challenges to a counter-example that he posed some years earlier to the Principle of the Common Cause (PCC). I agree that Sober has indeed produced a genuine counter-example to the PCC, but argue against the methodological moral that Sober wishes to draw from it. Contrary to Sober, I argue that the possibility of exceptions to the PCC does not undermine its status as a central assumption for methods that endeavor to draw causal (...)
A condition is formulated in terms of the probabilities of two pairs of correlated events in a classical probability space which is necessary for the two correlations to have a single (Reichenbachian) common-cause and it is shown that there exists pairs of correlated events probabilities of which violate the necessary condition. It is concluded that different correlations do not in general have a common common-cause. It is also shown that this conclusion remains valid even if one weakens slightly Reichenbach's definition (...)
Locke thought that it was impossible for there to be two things of the same kind in the same place at the same time. I offer (what looks to me like) a counterexample to that principle, involving two ships in the same place at the same time. I then consider two ways of explaining away, and one way of denying, the apparent counterexample of Locke's principle, and I argue that none is successful. I conclude that, although the case under discussion (...)
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| | Other links: mind.oxfordjournals.org jstor.org | Scholar | More.. Suppose that two geysers, about one mile apart, erupt at irregular intervals, but usually erupt almost exactly at the same time. One would suspect that they come from a common source, or at least that there is a common cause of their eruptions. And this common cause surely acts before both eruptions take place. This idea, that simultaneous correlated events must have prior common causes, was first made precise by Hans Reichenbach (Reichenbach 1956). It can be used to infer the (...)
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| | Other links: plato.stanford.edu | Scholar | More.. It is shown that, given any finite set of pairs of random events in a Boolean algebra which are correlated with respect to a fixed probability measure on the algebra, the algebra can be extended in such a way that the extension contains events that can be regarded as common causes of the correlations in the sense of Reichenbach's definition of common cause. It is shown, further, that, given any quantum probability space and any set of commuting events in it (...)
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If $\{{\cal A}(V)\}$ is a net of local von Neumann algebras satisfying standard axioms of algebraic relativistic quantum field theory and $V_1$ and $V_2$ are spacelike separated spacetime regions, then the system $({\cal A}(V_1),{\cal A}(V_2),\phi)$ is said to satisfy the Weak Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle iff for every pair of projections $A\in{\cal A}(V_1)$, $B\in{\cal A}(V_2)$ correlated in the normal state $\phi$ there exists a projection $C$ belonging to a von Neumann algebra associated with a spacetime region $V$ contained in the (...)
