Mind 105 (420):531-552 (1996)
|Abstract||This paper employs (and defends where needed) a familiar four-part methodology for assessing moral theories. This methodology makes the most popular kind of moral pluralism--here called Ross-style pluralism--look extremely attractive. The paper contends, however, that, if rule-consequentialism's implications match our considered moral convictions as well as Ross-style pluralism's implications do, the methodology makes rule-consequentialism look even more attractive than Ross-style pluralism. The paper then attacks two arguments recently put forward in defence of Ross-style pluralism. One of these arguments is that no moral theory containing some single normative principle to justify general pro tanto duties can do justice to the ineliminable role of judgment in moral thinking. The other argument is that no such theory is plausible in light of the fact that our moral ideas come from disparate historical sources|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Brad Hooker (1991). Rule-Consequentialism and Demandingness: A Reply to Carson. Mind 100 (2):269-276.
Brad Hooker (1994). Is Rule-Consequentialism a Rubber Duck? Analysis 54 (2):92 - 97.
Robert Guay (2005). A Refutation of Consequentialism. Metaphilosophy 36 (3):348-362.
Richard Arneson (2005). Sophisticated Rule Consequentialism: Some Simple Objections. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):235–251.
Brad Hooker (2000). Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. Oxford University Press.
Jacob Ross (2009). Should Kantians Be Consequentialists? Ratio 22 (1):126-135.
Iain Law (1999). Rule-Consequentialism's Dilemma. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):263-276.
Brad Hooker & Guy Fletcher (2008). Variable Versus Fixed-Rate Rule-Utilitarianism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):344–352.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads33 ( #41,931 of 722,826 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,826 )
How can I increase my downloads?