Some Questions Not to Be Begged in Moral Theory

This paper starts by considering Sterba’s argument from non-question-beggingness to morality. The paper goes on to discuss his use of the “ought” implies “can” principle and the place, within moral theorizing, of intuitions about reasonableness
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DOI 10.5840/ijap200519220
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