Aesthetics, experience, and discrimination

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (2):119–133 (2005)
Can indistinguishable objects differ aesthetically? Manifestationism answers ‘no’ on the grounds that (i) aesthetically significant features of an object must show up in our experience of it; and (ii) a feature—aesthetic or not—figures in our experience only if we can discriminate its presence. Goodman’s response to Manifestationism has been much discussed, but little understood. I explain and reject it. I then explore an alternative. Doubles can differ aesthetically provided, first, it is possible to experience them differently; and, second, those experiences reflect differences in the objects’ themselves. A range of objections to this position is considered, but all are found wanting.
Keywords Aesthetics  Forgery  Experience
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DOI 10.1111/j.0021-8529.2005.00189.x
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References found in this work BETA
Kendall L. Walton (1970). Categories of Art. Philosophical Review 79 (3):334-367.
James Elkins (1993). From Original to Copy and Back Again. British Journal of Aesthetics 33 (2):113-120.
Colin Radford (1978). Fakes. Mind 87 (345):66-76.
Mark Sagoff (1976). The Aesthetic Status of Forgeries. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 35 (2):169-180.
Crispin Sartwell (1988). Aesthetics of the Spurious. British Journal of Aesthetics 28 (4):360-367.

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Robert Hopkins (2006). Painting, History, and Experience. Philosophical Studies 127 (1):19 - 35.

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