Psychoanalysis, Philosophical Issues

Abstract
This paper briefly addresses questions of confirmation and disconfirmation in psychoanalysis. It argues that psychoanalysis enjoys Bayesian support as an interpretive extension of commonsense psychology that provides the best explanation of a large range of empirical data. Suggestion provides no such explanation, and recent work in attachment, developmental psychology, and neuroscience accord with this view.
Keywords Explanation Evidence Free Association Bayes' Theorm Suggestion
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