David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press (1993)
I. There are two points of view: ___ From the personal point of view, an action is a person's doing something for a reason, and her doing it is found intelligible when we know the reason that led her to it. ___ From the impersonal point of view, an action would be a link in a causal chain that could be viewed without paying any attention to people, the links being understood by reference to the world's causal workings
|Keywords||Action Causation Mental Reason|
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Citations of this work BETA
Wayne A. Davis (2005). Reasons and Psychological Causes. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
Constantine Sandis (2012). The Objects of Action Explanation. Ratio 25 (3):326-344.
Matias Bulnes (2013). Individualism and the Metaphysics of Actions. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):113-132.
John Michael McGuire (2007). Actions, Reasons, and Intentions: Overcoming Davidson's Ontological Prejudice. Dialogue 46 (3):459-479.
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