Agency and Deontic Logic

Oxford University Press (2001)
Abstract
John Horty effectively develops deontic logic (the logic of ethical concepts like obligation and permission) against the background of a formal theory of agency. He incorporates certain elements of decision theory to set out a new deontic account of what agents ought to do under various conditions over extended periods of time. Offering a conceptual rather than technical emphasis, Horty's framework allows a number of recent issues from moral theory to be set out clearly and discussed from a uniform point of view.
Keywords Deontic logic  Agent (Philosophy
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Call number BC145.H67 2001
ISBN(s) 0195134613   9780195134612
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Stephen Finlay & Justin Snedegar (2013). One Ought Too Many. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):102-124.
Jacob Ross (2010). The Irreducibility of Personal Obligation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):307 - 323.

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