A note concerning the notion of satisfiability
| Abstract | Tarski has shown how the argumentation of the liar paradox can be used to prove a theorem about truth in formalized languages. In this paper, it is shown how the paradox concerning the least undefinable ordinal can be used to prove a no go-theorem concerning the notion of satisfaction in formalized languages. Also, the connection of this theorem with the absolute notion of definability is discussed. | |||||||||
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