Connectionism and the philosophical foundations of cognitive science

Metaphilosophy 28 (1-2):1-30 (1997)
This is an overview of recent philosophical discussion about connectionism and the foundations of cognitive science. Connectionist modeling in cognitive science is described. Three broad conceptions of the mind are characterized, and their comparative strengths and weaknesses are discussed: (1) the classical computational conception in cognitive science; (2) a popular foundational interpretation of connectionism that John Tienson and I call “non-sentential computationalism”; and (3) an alternative interpretation of connectionism we call “dynamical cognition.” Also discussed are two recent philosophical attempts to enlist connectionism in defense of eliminativism about folk psychology
Keywords Cognitive Science  Connectionism  Folk  Psychology  Science
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9973.00039
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Daniel A. Weiskopf (2010). Embodied Cognition and Linguistic Comprehension. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):294-304.

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