David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80 (2007)
Computational properties, it is standardly assumed, are to be sharply distinguished from semantic properties. Specifically, while it is standardly assumed that the semantic properties of a cognitive system are externally or non-individualistically individuated, computational properties are supposed to be individualistic and internal. Yet some philosophers (e.g., Tyler Burge) argue that content impacts computation, and further, that environmental factors impact computation. Oron Shagrir has recently argued for these theses in a novel way, and gave them novel interpretations. In this paper I present a conception of computation in cognitive science that takes Shagrir's conception as its starting point, but further develops it in various directions and strengthens it. I argue that the explanatory role of computational properties emerges from the idea that syntactical properties and the relevant external factors presented by cognitive systems compose wide computational properties. I also elaborate upon the notion of content that is in play, and argue that it is contents of the kind that are ascribed by transparent interpretations of content ascriptions that impact computation. This fact enables the thesis that external factors impact computation to rebuff the challenge which concerns the claim that psychology must be individualistic
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Stephen P. Stich (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press.
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Citations of this work BETA
Nicholas Shea (2013). Naturalising Representational Content. Philosophy Compass 8 (5):496-509.
Oron Shagrir (2010). Marr on Computational-Level Theories. Philosophy of Science 77 (4):477-500.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2009). Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):515-532.
Similar books and articles
Keith Butler (1998). Content, Computation, and Individuation. Synthese 114 (2):277-92.
Paul R. Thagard (2002). How Molecules Matter to Mental Computation. Philosophy of Science 69 (3):497-518.
Eric Dietrich (1989). Semantics and the Computational Paradigm in Computational Psychology. Synthese 79 (April):119-41.
David J. Chalmers (2011). A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition. Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.
Restrepo Echavarria Ricardo (2009). Russell's Structuralism and the Supposed Death of Computational Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 19 (2):181-197.
Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1995). Computationalism. Synthese 105 (3):303-17.
Oron Shagrir (2006). Why We View the Brain as a Computer. Synthese 153 (3):393-416.
Ricardo Restrepo (2009). Russell's Structuralism and the Supposed Death of Computational Cognitive Science. Minds and Machines 19 (2):181-197.
Nir Fresco (2010). Explaining Computation Without Semantics: Keeping It Simple. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (2):165-181.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads52 ( #92,654 of 1,902,526 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #113,834 of 1,902,526 )
How can I increase my downloads?