Cognitive Pluralism

MIT Press (forthcoming)
Abstract
This book introduces an account of cognitive architecture, Cognitive Pluralism, on which the basic units of understanding are models of particular content domains. Having many mental models is a good adaptive strategy for cognition, but models can be incompatible with one another, leading to paradoxes and inconsistencies of belief, and it may not be possible to integrate the understanding supplied by multiple models into a comprehensive and self-consistent "super model". The book applies the theory to explaining intuitive reasoning and cognitive illusions and explores implications for epistemology, semantics, and disunity of science.
Keywords cognitive architecture  mental models  understanding  unity of knowledge
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