Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (4):367 - 413 (2007)
|Abstract||If we are told only that Tweety is a bird, it is natural to conclude that Tweety is able to ﬂy; our everyday reasoning seems to be governed by a default according to which birds, as a rule, can ﬂy. But if we are then told that Tweety is actually unable to ﬂy—information that it is, after all, consistent with our initial premise—we would withdraw our original conclusion. Any logic put forth to capture this form of reasoning must therefore exhibit a nonmonotonic consequence relation, allowing for the possibility that the conclusion set might shrink as the premise set grows.|
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