David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
This paper contributes to the foundations of a theory of rational choice for artiﬁcial agents in dynamic environments. Our work is developed within a theoretical framework, originally due to Bratman, that models resource-bounded agents as operating against the background of some current set of intentions, which helps to frame their subsequent reasoning. In contrast to the standard theory of rational choice, where options are evaluated in isolation, we therefore provide an analysis of situations in which the options presented to an agent are evaluated against a background context provided by the agent’s current plans—commitments to future activities, which may themselves be only partially speciﬁed. The interactions between the new options and the background context can complicate the task of evaluating the option, rendering it either more or less desirable in context than it would have been in isolation. 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Olivier Roy (2009). Intentions and Interactive Transformations of Decision Problems. Synthese 169 (2):335 - 349.
Yoav Shoham (2009). Logical Theories of Intention and the Database Perspective. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (6):633 - 647.
Similar books and articles
Michael McDermott (2008). Are Plans Necessary? Philosophical Studies 138 (2):225 - 232.
Isaac Levi (2008). Why Rational Agents Should Not Be Liberal Maximizers. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):1-17.
Edmund Chattoe-Brown (2009). The Social Transmission of Choice: A Simulation with Applications to Hegemonic Discourse. Mind and Society 8 (2):193-207.
Hans Rott (2011). Odd Choices: On the Rationality of Some Alleged Anomalies of Decision and Inference. Topoi 30 (1):59-69.
Neil Stewart, Nick Chater, Henry P. Stott & Stian Reimers (2003). Prospect Relativity: How Choice Options Influence Decision Under Risk. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 132 (1):23.
John L. Pollock, Against Optimality: Logical Foundations for Decision-Theoretic Planning in Autonomous Agents.
Alex Rajczi (2011). The Argument From Self-Creation: A Refutation of Act-Consequentialism and a Defense of Moral Options. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):315.
John L. Pollock (1992). New Foundations for Practical Reasoning. Minds and Machines 2 (2):113-144.
David Pinkowski (2013). Practically Equal: An Analysis of the Practical Nature of Equality and Incomparability. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 28 (4):457-470.
Peter Vallentyne (1991). Motivational Ties and Doing What One Most Wats. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:443-445.
Doron Sonsino & Marvin Mandelbaum (2001). On Preference for Flexibility and Complexity Aversion: Experimental Evidence. Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):197-216.
Wlodek Rabinowicz (1997). On Seidenfeldâs Criticism of Sophisticated Violations of the Independence Axiom. Theory and Decision 43 (3):279-292.
Added to index2011-02-09
Total downloads18 ( #92,805 of 1,101,088 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #290,992 of 1,101,088 )
How can I increase my downloads?