Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem

Erkenntnis 78 (2):333-351 (2013)
Abstract
We present a new argument for the claim that in the Sleeping Beauty problem, the probability that the coin comes up heads is 1/3. Our argument depends on a principle for the updating of probabilities that we call ‘generalized conditionalization’, and on a species of generalized conditionalization we call ‘synchronic conditionalization on old information’. We set forth a rationale for the legitimacy of generalized conditionalization, and we explain why our new argument for thirdism is immune to two attacks that Pust (Synthese 160:97–101, 2008) has leveled at other arguments for thirdism
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References found in this work BETA
EC Barnes (1999). The Quantitative Problem of Old Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (2):249-264.
Clark Glymour (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton University Press.

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