Levity

Mind 118 (471):555-581 (2009)
Abstract
In this article, the prospects of deflationism about the concept of truth are investigated. A new version of deflationism, called inferential deflationism, is articulated and defended. It is argued that it avoids the pitfalls of earlier deflationist views such as Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth and Field’s version of deflationism
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzp096
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Julien Murzi (2012). On Heck's New Liar. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):258-269.

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