Philosophical Studies 131 (1):157-83 (2006)
|Abstract||How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions.|
|Keywords||Conceptual Analysis Ideology Location Materialism Metaphysics Possible World|
|Through your library||Configure|
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