Metaphysical realism and psychologistic semantics

Erkenntnis 34 (3):297--322 (1991)
I propose a metaphysical position I call 'limited metaphysical realism', and I link it to a position in the philosophy of language I call 'psychologistic semantics'. Limited metaphysical realism asserts that there is a mind-independent, discourse-independent world, but posits a sparse ontology. Psychologistic semantics construes truth not as direct word/world correspondence, and not as warranted assertibility (or Putnam's "ideal" warranted assertibility), but rather as 'correct assertibility'. I argue that virtues of this package deal over each of the two broad positions that have recently dominated metaphysics and philosophy of language--positions I call package deal metaphysical realism, and package deal anti-realism
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Michael P. Lynch (1999). Relativity of Fact and Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):579-595.

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