Meaning, use and truth: On whether a use-theory of meaning is precluded by the requirement that whatever constitutes the meaning of a predicate be capable of determining the set of things of which the predicate is true and to which it ought to be applied
Graduate studies at Western
Mind 104 (414):355-368 (1995)
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